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AND PRESENTATION OF 
CREW MALFUNCTION PROCEDURES 
FOR THE APOLLO OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 
A. Purpose of Malfunction Procedures 
The uses of malfunction procedures are: 
1. Training the flight crew and ground support personnel. - They 
should give these personnel, through study and use in conjunction 
with other data, optimum operating techniques to be used in event 
of malfunctions, as well as a comprehensive understanding of the 
spacecraft systems characteristics and operating limits. 
2. Use by the flight crew and ground support personnel during the 
missions. - In order to assure a planned rationale for reacting 
to predictable contingencies, correct, comprehensive procedures 
will be developed and coordinated before the mission by appropriate 
technical and operational organizations. 
3. Development of Mission Rules. - Malfunction procedures provide compre-
hensive information on the effects of malfunctions and limitations 
and capabilities of the resultant configurations or alternate operating 
modes. They therefore serve as source data for development of mission 
rules relating to these malfunctions. 
B. General 
1. Purpose of this document. - This document is designed to provide the 
guidelines which are to be used in developing the malfunction procedures. 
It is the intent of the document that these guidelines will result 
in a unified malfunction procedure package as related to inter and 
intra cont r actor end i tems, The document contains a general 
' \ 
rationale to be employed while utilizing ~escribed rJ1les gf 
formatting ➔and content; a block diagram of the malfunction procedure 
development rationale and a sample procedure which specifies the symbols 
and other data to be used in writing the malfunction procedure. 
The rationale is intended to provide the developers of the malfunction 
procedures with a logically consistent approach in: Q ascertaining -
if there are actions which may be imposed on the system operator as a 
:;-
result of malfunction/ndss i an pbase relationship s prior to initiating 
the diagnostic procedures and@._ascertaining if subsy stem reconfiguration 
subsequent to failure determination is influenced by the failure effect 
and subsequent mission activities. This rationale is shown in fig. 1 
in block diagram form. 
The intent in prescribing rules of formatting and content is to effect 
enough standardization so that the data developed by the several parties 
involved can be understood and utilized with a minimum of confusion, and 
to give the developer guidelines which will help him to produce procedures 
of optimal effectiveness. 
2. Relation of Malfunction Procedures to Mission Rules - Malfunction pro-
cedures and mission rules both apply to system contingencies and, there-
fore, do interleave quite closely in that regard. For purposes of 
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understanding how to develop malfunction procedures, however, the 
following distinctions can be drawn: 
l 
Mission p a] e s ( for spacecraft system contingencies) are predeveloped 
decisions to be implemented in event of system malfunctions. They 
do not define the process of recognition or verification (diagnosis) 
of the malfunction. Conversely, the malfunction procedures do not 
specify changes in the mission plan (abort, deletion of mission 
objectives) as a result of a system malfunction. They do, however, 
explain the effect of the malfunction on the spacecraft and mission 
operation. 
3. Scope of Malfunctions to be covered - Procedures should be written to 
c ~ er all significEtnt siRgle fai}urez. Failure isolation should be 
completed only to the point where the resultant status and necessary 
corrective action is determined. 
In general, double unrelated failures should not be covered. This is 
necessary to prevent the procedures from becoming unmanageably complex. 
When, however, the necessary steps of a procedure include logical 
branches which represent double failures, it is often more convenient 
to cover them than not. 
C. Assumnti ons 
1. MSFN Coordination - It should be a_ssumed that the fli€:bt crew will 
coordinate anomalies with MSFN when possible and appropriate. It is 
not the function of the malfunction procedures to constantly remind 
the flight crew of the presence or capability of the ground support 
complex. The procedures should be developed as independently of the 
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ground as possible since tracking coverage limitations, conununications 
difficulties, and time criticality may force this independence. 
2. S,ontrol Cqnfign¾'ation - Checks of switch and circuit breaker configuration 
should generally not be included in the procedures. It should be assumed 
that the flight crew will verify the switch and circuit breaker positions 
at an appropriate time in the procedure. 
3. Instrumentat i on Discrepancies - Checks of on-board indications with 
telemetry of same parameters should not be included as procedural 
steps. It can be assumed that the flight crew will accomplish this as 
is possible and appropriate. Non-obvious checks, such as using parameters 
which a.re telemetered but not dis la ed on-board, or using one parameter 
to verify another, ?hould be incl uded where appropriate. Such checks 
should be made at a logical point in the procedure, such as when the 
results of procedural steps indicate an instrumentation discrepancy, 
or when no other steps can safely be taken without further knowledge. 
4. The procedures should be written for users who have a general systems 
knowledge but are not system specialists. 
5. Quantitative values used in the procedures to define pressures , 
temperatures, voltages, etc., should be true rather than indicated 
(true values adjusted for instrumentation errors). Latest instrumen-
tation calibrations will be used during flight. 
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D. Format 
1. Symptom Column - The symptom is the original cue which alerts the 
crew t o an aff- nomjnaJ eeaditiea in a spacecraft system or component. 
A symptom can be a caution-warning light, a meter reading, or a 
condition of a system product (engine does not fire, intercom lost, 
MSFN reports loss of TV signal, etc.). 
Explain and qualify the situation so that the user understands the 
symptom, and can use judgement in applying the procedure to the actual 
condition which exists. As an example of this point "SM RCS HELIUM 
MANIFOLD PRESSURE HIGH" is a relative, not an absolute, symptom. The 
actual symptom being investigated may be 1 or 50 psia higher than 
normal, with an increasing or decreasing rate. In the "Symptom" 
column below the symptom box should be stated such information ~ 
"Normal regulated pressure 178-184 psia. Gurst disc ruptures ~ 
20-236 psia. Relief valve opens 225-248 psia, reseats 220 psia. 
operable thru this pressure range but some loss of helium may 
esult due to venting, possible relief valve leakage"] With this 
information the user understands the relative importance of the symptom 
and the urgency with which he must treat the symptom, and can make the 
proper "tradeoffs" between this and other problems which he may be facing. 
The sole purpose of the Symptom Column is to allow entry into the 
procedure. Symptoms which are available without procedural steps may 
be grouped together allowing entry into the procedures at a point closer 
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to resolution, and minimizing the procedural branching required. 
Results of procedural steps (i.e., TEMP remains high) will not be 
listed in the Symptom Column unless they also represent independent 
points of entry into the procedure. All the inputs to a caution/ 
warning light generally can be considered independent points of 
entry, since out of tolerance conditions could be noted within 
threshold values, and will therefore be listed as appropriate beneath 
thear caution or warning light. In general, symptoms should be 
relative, not specific (i.e. , "02 FLOW HI" , not "02 FLOW ABOVE __ 
lbs/hr.). The procedure given for a symptom, qualified by appropriate 
remarks, should be applicable to any degree of the symptom. 
Some symptoms must be treated differently as a function of mission 
condition and/or spacecraft configuration. Where this is necessary 
the different treatments must be included either by using notes to 
qualify the application to the various mission conditions, by including 
separate paths within the procedure, or by listing the different cases 
as separate symptoms (as in "SPS PRESS CAUTION LIGHT DURING THRUSTING" 
and"--- DURING NON-THRUSTING". To achieve this goal, t,he procedure 
9:§Velo~er must ask the following questions: 
---Sf::Y a) Is the symptom indicative of probable immediate crew hazards? 
--------=? b) Is an alternative rocedure required to safely continue the s stem 
function before a diagnosis is performed? 
- -~- c) Will the malfunctioning system get out of hand if not attended to 
promptly? 
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Those symptoms which indicate a threat to crew safety require a 
separate branch from the symptom to some form of emergency procedure 
prior to entering the diagnostic routine. Symptoms which are mission 
or system configuration critical will require a logic box in the 
procedure column which states the conditions being considered. This 
logic box will then lead to preprogrammed procedures that of necessity 
occur before any diagnostic steps may be taken and to normal control/ 
diagnostic steps when the condition is not considered critical. 
If the symptom can be classified as independent of crew safety and 
mission or system configuration conditions then the symptom will lead 
directly to the diagnostic procedure, without any intermediate logic boxes. 
The developer should examine each failure case considered to verify that 
the prescribed procedure does rationally cover all the conditions which 
could apply. Remember, however, that a single procedure for a symptom 
may apply regardless of mission condition or spacecraft configuration. 
2. Procedures Column - This column presents a step-by-step listing of the 
tasks required to: 
a) Establish criticality of Malfunction/Mission phase relationship. 
b) Gain control of the situation - stop divergent rates, gross leaks; 
protect threatened components. 
c) Determine the source and nature of the problem - find out what failed, 
and mission constraints as required. 
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hen the symptom is under control~ the procedure should attempt to 
determine what caused the f ai lure before utilizing redundant components, 
thereby minimizing the probability of exposing the redundant component 
to the same hazardous condition which caused the first to fail. 
For cases where a symptom represents several failure possibilities, 
~reatment of the symptom should first favor time criticality, ~ en 
efficiency (most probable failures, or those most easily considered). 
---.... 
General statements should not be included in this column, but should 
be remote evented to remarks column. However, Warning & Caution notes 
should be included to inform the crew of undesirable conditions. 
For special subroutines (e.g. manual thrust vector control) a separate 
page can be utilized at the back of the procedure for that system. A 
reference to the separate page will be included in the malfunction 
procedure column. 
For complex reconfiguration routines (e.g. fuel cell shut down) a 
. ~ separate page can be utilized at the back of the procedure for that 
r ~ . <"" 
.n .. ~ 7 system. L A reference to the separate page will be included in the 
j/)-~~ I "---~~ 
J./1"'- ' malfunction procedure column.] 
46.,..L 
In ~ circumstances the use of step-by-step switching and logic tasks 
becomes more complex than a corresponding narrative statement. In such 
cases the simpler format will be used providing it clearly defines the 
action to be taken, including any subsequent branching. As an example, 
removing a faulty fuel cell from the line preparatory to shutting it 
down is simple, but the variables involved (present fuel cell-bus tie 
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configuration and desired reconfiguration) defy practical listing 
at the switching level. Use: 
Step X.l Reconfigure Fuel Cell-Bus Ties such that Main Bus A and B 
are both powere·d (as desired) by the normal fuel cells. 
X.2 FUEL CELL 1 (2, 3) MAIN BUS A and B - OFF (Verify flags (2) -
striped¥,(~~ ~ ~ r-• - - -----~ X.3 FUEL CELL 1 (2, 3) REACTANTS - .Q!!. (Verify 
X.4 FUEL CELL PUMP 1 (2, 3) - ~ 
3. Remarks Column 
This column is intended to include information as follows: 
a) Amplifying remarks which relate to decision and/or action items 
(eg - why a step is taken, possible system time lags, etc.). 
b) The resultant subsystem status or operational capability including 
conditions of subsequent usage when a failure has been identified. 
c) Other remarks which explain or amplify the procedures. 
E. Data Requirements 
The procedure developer will be reqm,red to provide the data upon which 
he has based his procedure. This data should include . but not be limited 
to the following. 
1. The rationale that dictated the symptoms chosen, and 
2. The mission considerations which were investigated in writing the 
procedure. 
The data can be comprised of both formal and informal ~ocumentation and will 
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